With the assistance of this sort of memory people finally came to "reason". The feeling of being indebted to the gods did not stop growing for several thousands of years—always, in fact, in direct proportion to the extent to which the idea of god and the feeling for god grew and were carried to the heights.
But how is it that that other melancholy object, the consciousness of sin, the whole "bad conscience," came into the world. I believe that that fantasy has been done away with which sees the beginning of the state in some "contract.
It's more the case that they first come to light as the swamp plants they are when the swamp to which they belong is there—I mean the sickly mollycoddling and moralizing, thanks to which the animal "man" finally learns to feel shame about all his instincts. At the end of the previous section I even talked as if there was no such thing as this moralizing and thus as if now these ideas had necessarily come to an end after the collapse of their presuppositions, the faith in our "creditor," in God.
We cannot entertain the slightest doubts about this: Must not that philosophic invention, so audacious and so fatal, which was then absolutely new to Europe, the invention of "free will," of the absolute spontaneity of man in good and evil, simply have been made for the specific purpose of justifying the idea, that the interest of the gods in humanity and human virtue was inexhaustible.
As deniers of teleologytheir "last crowings" are "To what end. The most drastic measure, however, taken and effectuated by the supreme power, to combat the preponderance of the feelings of spite and vindictiveness—it takes this measure as soon as it is at all strong enough to do so—is the foundation of law, the imperative declaration of what in its eyes is to be regarded as just and lawful, and what unjust and unlawful: The "free" man, the owner of an enduring unbreakable will, by possessing this, also acquires his own standard of value: Since reason, according to this view, leads to so many errors, we should divorce our wills from reason, employing it only as a crude tool when absolutely necessary.
Ah, reason, seriousness, mastery over emotions, the whole gloomy business called reflection, all these privileges and ceremonies of human beings—how expensive they were.
For Nietzsche, refining and exercising our wills in this life is the ultimate end, and any dogma that inhibits this process is a manifestation of sickness.
He who can command, he who is a master by "nature," he who comes on the scene forceful in deed and gesture—what has he to do with contracts. Speaking generally, there is no doubt but that even the justest individual only requires a little dose of hostility, malice, or innuendo to drive the blood into his brain and the fairness from it.
I have already revealed its origin, in the contractual relationship between creditor and ower, that is as old as the existence of legal rights at all, and in its turn points back to the primary forms of purchase, sale, barter, and trade. In himself he arouses a certain interest, tension, hope, almost a certainty, as if something is announcing itself in him, is preparing itself, as if the human being were not the goal but only the way, an episode, a great promise.
Nietzsche provides a long list of different "meanings" that punishment has had over the ages. Measured always by the standard of antiquity this antiquity, moreover, is present or again possible at all periodsthe community stands to its members in that important and radical relationship of creditor to his owers.
Later we will have another look at the process by which the gods were ennobled and exalted which is naturally not at all the same thing as their becoming "holy". Instead, Nietzsche anxiously presses on to a critique of the State, asserting that it emerged in much the same position as the early creditor.
The task of breeding an animal with a right to make promises contains within it, as we have already grasped, as a condition and prerequisite, the more urgent prior task of making a human being necessarily uniform to some extent, one among many other like him, regular and consequently predictable.
In this aspect Foucault was heavily influenced by Nietzsche. Nietzsche rebukes the "English psychologists" for lacking historical sense.
What can people give back to them. There prevails in them the conviction that it is only thanks to sacrifices and efforts of their ancestors, that the race persists at all—and that this has to be paid back to them by sacrifices and services.
I'll say it once more—or perhaps I haven't said it at all yet—they are useless. Enmity, cruelty, joy in pursuit, in attack, in change, in destruction—all those turned themselves against the possessors of such instincts. Think of the old German punishments, for example, stoning even the legend lets the mill stone fall on the head of the guilty personbreaking on the wheel the unique invention and specialty of the German genius in the area of punishment.
He sought merely to alter the locus of debate; in that, for those who have digested his works, he more than succeeded.
It is here that Nietzsche is most original and convincing. And this for Nietzsche highlights the horrors of Christianity, the reason for his ceaseless critique: For what a long stretch of time this fruit must have hung tart and sour on the tree.
The very oldest form of astuteness was bred here—here, too, we can assume are the first beginnings of human pride, his feeling of pre-eminence in relation to other animals. And beyond that, one thing we do know—I have no doubt about it—namely, the nature of the pleasure which the selfless, self-denying, self-sacrificing person experiences from the start: This suspicion remains and grows.
The man in whom this repression apparatus is harmed and not working properly we can compare to a dyspeptic and not just compare —he is "finished" with nothing. Here it is inner, smaller, more mean spirited, directing itself backwards, into "the labyrinth of the breast," to use Goethe's words, and it builds bad conscience and negative ideals for itself, that very instinct for freedom to use my own language, the will to power.
Animal experimentation is wrong essay about myself Animal experimentation is wrong essay about myself essay of african nationalism pdf rechtsvergleichende dissertation gliederung telefonnummern essay on why become a nurse world population increase essay czar peter the great essayists buddhist temple visit essays chiffrement affine explication essay essay on brain drain problem in nepal s.
Under such conditions the destructive, sadistic instincts of man, who is by nature a nomadic hunter, find themselves constricted and thwarted; they are therefore turned inward.
As the power and the self-consciousness of a community increases, so proportionately does the penal law become mitigated; conversely every weakening and jeopardising of the community revives the harshest forms of that law.
The feeling of being indebted to the gods did not stop growing for several thousands of years—always, in fact, in direct proportion to the extent to which the idea of god and the feeling for god grew and were carried to the heights.
It is often overlooked that Nietzsche exerted a decisive influence on many modernist writers—Andre Gide, Thomas Mann, Albert Camus, Henry Milleramong many, many others—none of whom took him for racist.
Do you understand that?. Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals: Summary & Analysis essential morality. Second Essay Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals: Summary & Analysis Related Study Materials.
Related. Note's on Nietzsche's Genealogy. A warning.
There is much disagreement in Nietzsche scholarship. Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals Here, Nietzsche uses the term "genealogy" in its fundamental sense: an account (logos) of the genesis of a thing.
Second Essay 1. Humans are unique because they have the ability to plan for the future, and so.
In this post, I briefly note some of the more interesting points that struck my notice in the second and third essays of The Genealogy of Morals. At ii, Nietzsche articulates a view. On the Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay Friedrich Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay Lyrics. Second Essay Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Related Matters 1.
A summary of Second Essay, Sections in Friedrich Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals. Learn exactly what happened in this chapter, scene, or section of Genealogy of Morals and what it means. Perfect for acing essays, tests, and quizzes, as well as for writing lesson plans.
The immense task in what I have called the "morality of custom" (cf.
Daybreak, p. 7, 13, 16), the essential work of a man on his own self in the longest-lasting age of the human race, his entire pre-historical work, derives its meaning, its grand justification, from the following point, no matter how much hardship, tyranny, monotony and idiocy it also manifested: with the help of the morality of custom and the social .Genealogy of morals 2nd essay